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We study debt funding markets in which lenders can invest in financial exper-
tise to reduce a cost of acquiring information about the underlying collateral. If the
pledgeability of corporate income is low, lenders’ information acquisition enhances
liquidity, but they reduce expertise acquisition because of a hold-up problem. By con-
trast, if the pledgeability is high, information acquisition reduces liquidity, so that
lenders can extract rents from firms by investing in expertise and creating fear of illiq-
uidity. In this case, as information about collateral decays over time, there is growth
in credit and expertise acquisition, making the economy more vulnerable to an aggre-
gate shock. These results suggest that the growth of the financial sector is associated
with prevalence of opaque assets and a subsequent crisis.
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The financial sector has aggressively acquired financial expertise. Philippon and Reshef
(2012) demonstrate that in recent decades, the US financial industry has increased infor-
mation technology spending and attracted highly talented workers compared to other
sectors of the economy, and that these investments in financial expertise are strongly as-
sociated with a rise in remuneration in this sector.1 The expertise allows financial firms
to gather and process information about complex assets more easily and provide their fi-
nancial services more efficiently. However, given that financial firms played a major role
in the 2007–09 financial crisis (Gorton, 2010), the social value of their expertise has been
questioned.2 It is therefore imperative to investigate under what conditions and why the
acquisition of expertise arises in the financial industry.
In this study, we examine expertise acquisition incentives in a model of debt funding
markets, where expertise reduces the cost of acquiring information about the quality of
the collateral. We show that equilibrium investment in expertise is inefficient, but for
different reasons depending on the degree of pledgeability. If the pledgeability is low,
information acquisition enhances liquidity, but investors reduce their investments in ex-
pertise because of a hold-up problem. By contrast, if the pledgeability is high, information
acquisition causes illiquidity, thereby allowing investors with expertise to create fear of
illiquidity and improve their bargaining positions with borrowers. In equilibrium, igno-
rant experts—investors that acquire expertise but do not use it to produce information—
emerge. In this case, as information about collateral depreciates over time, both a credit
boom and a growth in expertise occur, leaving financial markets vulnerable to an aggre-
gate shock.
1See also Goldin and Katz (2008) for an increase in talented workers in the financial industry and Kaplan
and Rauh (2010) for their increasing representation among top income earners.
2Adair Turner, a former chairman of the UK’s Financial Services Authority, comments that: “There is
no clear evidence that the growth in the scale and complexity of the financial system in the rich developed
world over the last 20 to 30 years has driven increased growth or stability, and it is possible for financial
activity to extract rents from the real economy rather than to deliver economy value” (Turner, 2010).
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We build on the idea that symmetric ignorance can enhance liquidity in markets and
its breakdown lead to a crisis, which has been advocated by Gorton and Ordoñez (2014),
Dang et al. (2015), and Holmström (2015).3 When issuing “information-insensitive debt,”
which provides no gain from acquiring information about the quality of underlying col-
lateral, financial markets are free from adverse selection and highly liquid. However,
when the debt becomes information-sensitive in response to a shock, private information
production arises, and liquidity dries up. We explore the relationship between the infor-
mation sensitivity of debt and expertise acquisition for a better understanding of recent
developments in the financial sector.
In our environment, firms borrow funds from investors by offering short-term con-
tracts to finance a project requiring a fixed investment. Because the pledgeability of cash
flows from firms’ investment project is imperfect, as in Holmström and Tirole (1997, 1998),
they need to pose an asset as collateral to make up for the lack of pledgeability. The as-
sets used as collateral have a heterogenous quality, high or low, which is unknown for
investors and firms ex ante. However, after finding a firm, each investor can acquire in-
formation about the quality of collateral at a cost for the lending decisions; lending when
the collateral is of high quality and refusing to lend when it is of low quality. We interpret
the assets used as collateral as preexisting financial securities (e.g., asset- and mortgage-
backed securities) that are so complex and opaque that agents find it difficult to evaluate
their fundamental values without due diligence by experts.
The important feature of our model is that before finding a firm, each investor can
acquire expertise that reduces a cost of information acquisition. Expertise acquisition
incentives depend on the pledgeability of investment returns, which affects their prefer-
ence for information acquisition about collateral. On the one hand, if the pledgeability
is relatively low, average-quality collateral is not enough to cover the lack of pledgeabil-
ity and thus, no firm obtains financing without information acquisition. This motivates
3The idea that information is value-destroying goes back to Hirshleifer (1971) who shows that public
information restricts risk-sharing. See also Gorton and Pennacchi (1990).
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firms to design financial contracts that induce information acquisition by investors and
makes their expertise acquisition socially desirable. But, a trading friction in financial
markets creates a hold-up problem for investors’ investments in expertise. This results
in under-investment in expertise. On the other hand, if the pledgeability is relatively
high, average-quality collateral allows firms to obtain funds and so, all firms can finance
efficient projects by preventing investors from acquiring information. In this case, infor-
mation acquisition reduces the possibility of funding and thus, expertise acquisition is
socially undesirable. Nonetheless, investors acquire expertise to use it as a threat to ex-
tract rents from firms rather than to use it for information production. This implies that
over-investment in expertise arises.
In a dynamic model, we demonstrate how a decay of information about collateral over
time leads to financial fragility. As in Gorton and Ordoñez (2014), we introduce idiosyn-
cratic shocks that transform collateral that is of known quality into opaque collateral with
high perceived quality. The firms with collateral that was known to be bad can obtain fi-
nancing through uninformed lending after the shock hits; accordingly, information about
collateral decays and credit expands over time. The rise in lending without information
acquisition increases the opportunities for investors to extract rents, encouraging their
expertise acquisition. However, the boom does not last so long time. As the boom lasts
longer and expertise acquisition grows, investors are more likely to start to produce infor-
mation about opaque collateral in response to aggregate shocks that reduce the average
quality of collateral. The informational regime change from a state where no one acquires
information about the true quality of collateral to a state where investors start to produce
information leads to deterioration in funding liquidity and a decline in aggregate output.
Thus, as opaque assets are more circulated in markets, credit and level of expertise grow,
and the likelihood that a subsequent crisis will occur increases.
This result offers a coherent explanation for the recent financial crisis. Prior to the
financial crisis, securitization, that is, the process of pooling and tranching a set of as-
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sets, created large quantities of AAA-rated asset- and mortgage-backed securities from
risky assets, such as subprime mortgages (Coval et al., 2009). Although these securitized
products were complex and opaque, they were considered by investors to be safe and
regularly used as collateral in the repo markets, where the overall size, from the dealers’
perspective, of reverse repo markets was estimated to be roughly $4 trillion (Copeland et
al., 2014).4 However, the repo markets collapsed during the crisis and were recognized as
the major source of financial instability (Gorton and Metrick, 2012).5 Gorton and Metrick
(2010) demonstrate that haircuts on subprime-related assets were zero before the crisis
but then increased and eventually reached 100 percent in 2009, whereas haircuts on non-
subprime-related products reached about 20 percent. Our model implies that the growth
in securitization that produces opaque assets and fuels a credit boom encourages an ac-
tive acquisition of expertise for rent extraction, which makes information production and
a subsequent collapse in markets more likely.
Related Literature: This paper is related to several strands of literature.
Our study builds on literature on theories of collateral. The existing models of col-
lateral examine its impact on financial contracts in a variety of settings, such as adverse
selection (Bester, 1985, 1987; Chan and Kanatas, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987) and
moral hazard (Chan and Thakor, 1987; Boot et al., 1991; Boot and Thakor, 1994). Recent
literature (e.g., Di Maggio and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2015 and Parlatore, forthcoming) studies a
model of collateralized loans by incorporating trading friction and relates the setup to a
repo market. This literature typically focuses on incentive problems on the borrowers’
side, while our focus is on the lenders’ side. A few exceptions are Rajan and Winton
(1995), Manove et al. (2001), and Inderst and Mueller (2007), who show that collateral in-
4Reverse repo markets comprise repo transactions in which dealers lend to their clients (e.g., hedge
funds) or to other dealers. About 92% of this activity consists of bilateral reverse repo.
5A significant rise in margins in bilateral repos is observed in a market wherein dealers lend to clients
such as hedge funds (Copeland et al., 2014). Copeland et al. (2014) and Krishnamurthy et al. (2014) doc-
ument that, in contrast with bilateral repo markets, the tri-party repo markets, wherein dealers mainly
borrowed funds from cash providers such as money market funds and security lenders, were relatively
stable.
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fluences project screening. Our work, in contrast, focuses on lenders’ incentives to screen
collateral and their expertise acquisition.
Our study also contributes to the growing literature on the compensation of finance
employees. Thanassoulis (2012) and Acharya et al. (2016) show that the growth in com-
pensation in the financial industry is driven by competition for managerial talent to yield
high returns. In Myerson (2012), Axelson and Bond (2015) and Biais and Landier (2015),
high financial sector compensation arises from the moral hazard problem. In our paper,
however, a rise in compensation is due to the expertise that improves the ability to eval-
uate financial claims.
This line of work is also related to the literature concerned with the optimal level of
financial expertise.6 Glode et al. (2012), Biais et al. (2015), Fishman and Parker (2015), and
Bolton et al. (2016) develop models in which excessive acquisition of expertise occurs.
Kurlat (forthcoming) demonstrates that too much expertise is acquired for junk bond un-
derwriting and venture capital. In these works, however, having more expertise means
producing more information. In contrast, our model treats expertise acquisition and in-
formation acquisition separately so that decay of information can go hand-in-hand with
growth in expertise acquisition, leading to boom and bust. Moreover, in contrast to their
works, we show that investment in expertise is inefficiently high when the pledgeabil-
ity is high but inefficiently low when the pledgeability is low. This suggests that policy
implications differ depending on the pledgeability.
Our paper is also related to the burgeoning literature that attributes the adverse selec-
tion problem to the cause of financial crises (e.g., Kurlat, 2013; Chari et al., 2014; Guerrieri
and Shimer, 2014; Bigio, 2015). These papers, however, treat information asymmetry as
exogenous. In contrast, our model features endogenous information asymmetry, as in
Gorton and Ordoñez (2014), which concurs with our view that circulation of opaque as-
6Philippon (2010), Cahuc and Challe (2012), and Shakhnov (2018) also focus on the optimal size of the
financial sector. They argue that the difference between private and social returns of entrepreneurship
draws too many individuals into the financial sector and discourages productive activity.
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sets generates a credit boom followed by a crisis at the point of informational regime
change. The difference is that their model assumes that the level of expertise (i.e., cost
of information acquisition) is exogenously given, whereas we allow for the acquisition
of expertise. The different modeling allows us to show that the credit boom entails the
growth in the financial sector, which makes the financial market more sensitive to a neg-
ative aggregate shock.
Outline: The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the set-
ting of the static model. Section 3 analyzes two benchmark cases, of which in the first,
investors cannot produce private information about the quality of underlying collateral,
and in the second, everyone knows the true quality of collateral ex ante. These exercises
allow us to clarify the key mechanism through which information about collateral affects
financial contracts. Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium of the static model. Section 5
extends the static model into the dynamic setting wherein there is a depreciation of infor-
mation about collateral over time. Section 6 concludes.
2 Static Model
In this section, we describe the setup of the model.
The economy has a single good used for investment and consumption. There are two
types of continuum of agents with unit mass: investors and firms. Both agents are risk-
neutral and drive utility from consumption at the end of the period. While firms have no
endowment of goods, investors are endowed with a sufficient amount of goods. Firms
are protected by limited liability.
Each firm has a project that requires a fixed investment I > 0. It produces nothing in
the case of failure and returns R > 0 in the case of success. The project is subject to moral
hazard, as in Holmström and Tirole (1997, 1998). The firm can choose whether to behave
or misbehave secretly. In the case of behaving, the project succeeds with probability p 2
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(0, 1]. In the case of misbehaving, the firm enjoys private benefit B > 0 but must accept
that the probability of success decreases by Dp 2 (0, p). We assume that the project
has positive net present value (NPV) if a firm behaves but negative NPV even with the
inclusion of private benefit if the firm misbehaves.
Assumption 1 pR > I > (p  Dp)R+ B.
Each firm owns a legacy asset, which has two types of quality: good and bad. The
asset is good with probability f 2 [0, 1] and bad with probability 1  f. At the end of the
period, the owner of an asset receives C units of goods if the asset is good and nothing if
it is bad. No one knows the true quality of assets at the beginning of the period. We view
these assets as preexisting financial securities, including mortgage-related securities, and
consider that the complexity of their design makes it difficult to estimate their real value.
To run a project, firms need to rely on external financing. Each firm is randomly
matched with a single investor, and the firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the in-
vestor. The assumptions of random matching and bilateral contract are intended to cap-
ture the fact that the new complex securities are mainly traded in an over-the-counter
market (e.g., Duffie et al., 2005). The financial contract has the following structure: (i)
the investor contributes I; (ii) when the project succeeds, the investor receives Ri and the
firm receives R   Ri from its cash flow; and (iii) when the project fails, both parties do
not receive anything from the investment return, and the investor seizes the collateral the
firm poses with probability x 2 [0, 1]. We discuss more general contracts in Section 4.5.
After receiving the financial contract offered by a firm but before deciding whether to
accept the offered contract, an investor can produce costly private information about the
quality of collateral that the firm pledges. By paying g 2 [0,gmax] units of goods, each
investor knows the true quality of collateral perfectly. The cost of information acquisition
g can be interpreted as an inverse measure of the investor’s financial expertise, that is,
investors with lower g have more expertise.7 The underlying idea is that investors who













have more financial expertise find it easier to gather and process information about the
complex assets. The important feature of our model is that the level of expertise g is
an endogenous variable. Before financial contracts are offered, each investor chooses g
incurring a cost y(gmax   g), with y  0 and y0  0. While g is publicly observable,
acquisition of information is unobservable.
The timing of events is as follows. Each investor chooses the level of financial expertise
g. Then, each firm is matched with a single investor and offers a financial contract (Ri, x).
After receiving the contract, the investor decides whether to acquire costly information
about the quality of the collateral that the firm pledges and whether to provide funds.
If the investor accepts the contract, the firm runs a project and chooses either to behave
or misbehave. If the investor rejects the contract, both the firm and the investor keeps
holding their own endowment. Finally, all outcomes are realized, outputs are shared as
contracted, and consumption occurs. Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the model.
Finally, we define an equilibrium in the following way.
Definition 1 (Equilibirum) A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is given by firms’ contracts (Ri, x),
their choice between behaving and misbehaving, investors’ expertise g, their decisions on informa-
tion acquisition and financing, and all agents’ beliefs concerning the quality of assets such that the
following conditions are satisfied:
• Firms’ contracts (Ri, x) and their choice between behaving and misbehaving are optimal
where beliefs and the investors’ strategies are taken as given;
• The investors’ decisions on expertise g, information acquisition, and financing are optimal,
where beliefs and the firms’ strategies are taken as given;
underlying collateral by paying a fixed cost. Although this approach makes the analysis more complicated,
the main conclusions remain unchanged.
9
• Beliefs are consistent with Bayes’ rule, given equilibrium strategies, whenever possible.
3 Symmetric Ignorance versus Full Information
In this section, for the benchmark cases, we suppose that investors cannot acquire in-
formation (or expertise). We focus on two information regimes: the first is symmetric
ignorance, where no one knows the true quality of collateral, and the second is full infor-
mation, where everyone knows the quality of collateral. By comparing the two cases, we
study the key relationship between information about collateral and funding liquidity.
Let f˜ be agents’ conjecture about a probability that collateral is good. In the case of
symmetric ignorance, the conjecture on the probability of good collateral is f˜ = f for
any firm. In the case of full information, f˜ = 1 for firms with good collateral and f˜ = 0




p(R  Ri)  (1  p)xf˜C (1)
subject to
pRi + (1  p)xf˜C  I, (2)
p(R  Ri)  (1  p)xf˜C  0, (3)
p(R  Ri)  (1  p)xf˜C  (p  Dp)(R  Ri)  (1  p+ Dp)xf˜C+ B, (4)
0  x  1. (5)
The objective function (1) is the firm’s net expected payoff. (2) is the individual rationality
(IR) constraint for investors, which requires that investors earn non-negative payoff from
financial contracts. (3) is the IR constraint for firms. (4) is the incentive compatibility (IC)
constraint, which requires that firms prefer behaving to misbehaving. (5) is the feasibility
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constraint.
A decrease in compensation for an investor Ri increases the firm’s payoff (1) and
strengthens the incentive to behave from (4). This leads the firm to decrease Ri until
investors break even, that is, the IR constraint (2) is binding. Then, (1) is rewritten as
pR  I, meaning that the firm that obtains financing receives a payoff equal to the entire
social surplus. Since (3) is not binding, any contract (Ri, x) that satisfies (2) with equality,
the IC constraint (4), and the feasibility constraint (5) is the optimal. Given that a higher
x relaxes (4), financing actually occurs if








(6) means that if the sum of the expected pledgeable cash flows from firms’ project r and
their collateral f˜C exceeds the cost of investment I, the firm secures financing.
The following proposition describes the effect of information about collateral on in-
vestors’ financing decision.
Proposition 1 (Information and financial contract) Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and
investors cannot acquire private information about the quality of collateral. Then, there are four
cases:
(i) If r  I, there exists an optimal contract in which collateral pledging is unnecessary (x =
0), so that all firms obtain financing, regardless of beliefs about collateral f˜.
(ii) If 0 < I   r  fC, then in any optimal contract, collateral pledging is needed (x > 0).
In the case of symmetric ignorance, all firms secure financing, whereas in the case of full
information, only firms with good collateral secure financing.
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Collateralized loan No financing
No financing
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Collateralized loan only for 
firms with good collateral
Shortfall of  pledgeable
income I   ⇢
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Shortfall of  pledgeable
income I   ⇢
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Figure 2: Financial contract in each information regime
whereas in the case of full information, only firms that pledge good collateral secure financ-
ing.
(iv) If I   r > C, no financing occurs, regardless of f˜.
Proposition 1 states that the relationship between information about collateral and the
financial contract depends on a firm’s level of pledgeable cash r compared with invest-
ment I. The result is summarized in Figure 2. If the pledgeability is high enough that
investors can recoup their investment from cash flows alone (r  I), or low enough that
firms cannot obtain financing regardless of collateral quality (r < I   C), there is no role
for collateral. If the pledgeability is of intermediate level (0 < I   r  C), collateral is
necessary to fill the gap between the cost of financing and the pledgeable income, and
information about collateral quality matters in the financial contract.
When the shortfall I   r is relatively small (0 < I   r  fC), (6) holds with f˜ = 1
and f but not with f˜ = 0. This means that with full information, firms whose collateral is
identified as bad are not funded, and net aggregate output results in f(pR  I). However,
with symmetric ignorance, the economy benefits from cross-subsidization of firms with
bad collateral by those with good collateral. Expected collateral value suffices to make
up for the lack of pledgeable cash, and the economy achieves the first-best level of net
12
aggregate output pR  I. Thus, in the case of symmetric ignorance, financial markets are
more liquid and net aggregate output is larger than in the case of full information.
When the shortfall I   r is relatively large (fC < I   r  C), (6) holds with f˜ = 1
but not with f˜ = f and 0. This implies that under symmetric ignorance, collateral is
no longer enough to cover the lack of pledgeable cash, and financing does not occur.
By contrast, under full information, firms whose collateral is known to be good are still
able to cover their investment need. Therefore, full information enhances liquidity and
increases output compared with symmetric ignorance.
In the remainder of this paper, to ensure that collateral plays a role in financial con-
tracts, we assume the intermediate level of pledgeability:
Assumption 2 0 < I   r  C.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we return to the original model in which no one knows the true quality of
collateral at the beginning of the period and investors can acquire expertise and private
information about collateral. First, Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 analyze the case of high
pledgeability, r  I   fC, in which information about collateral reduces liquidity from
Proposition 1. Then, Section 4.3 analyzes the case of low pledgeability, r < I   fC, in
which information about collateral enhances liquidity. Section 4.4 analyzes efficiency in
both cases and shows that investors over-invest in expertise in the case of high pledge-
ability and under-invest in expertise in the case of low pledgeability. Section 4.5 discusses
assumptions.
4.1 Optimal Contract
Given that investors can acquire information about collateral at a cost g, firms optimally
choose between a financial contract that triggers information acquisition (referred to as
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information-sensitive debt) or one that does not trigger information acquisition (referred to
as information-insensitive debt). We show that when the pledgeable cash is high enough
(r  I   fC), issuing information-insensitive debt enhances liquidity, but this may be
costly to firms because they need to promise investors compensation commensurate with
their expertise to prevent information acquisition.
First, consider firms offering an information-insensitive debt contract (RiI I , xI I). Firms
choose the contract (RiI I , xI I) to maximize
p(R  RiI I)  (1  p)xI IfC (8)
subject to
pRiI I + (1  p)xI IfC  I, (9)
p(R  RiI I)  (1  p)xI IfC  0, (10)




0  xI I  1, (12)
pRiI I + (1  p)xI IfC  I  f
h
pRiI I + (1  p)xI IC  I
i
  g. (13)
Similar to the optimization problem (1)-(5) with f˜ = f, the objective function (8) is the
firm’s net payoff, (9) is the IR constraint for investors, (10) is the IR constraint for firms,
(11) is the IC constraint, and (12) is the feasibility constraint.
The additional constraint is (13), which ensures that investors’ payoff without acquir-
ing information (the left-hand side) is larger than the payoff with acquiring information
(the right-hand side). If investors acquire information, they accept the offered contract
and provide funds if the firm has good collateral and refuse if the firm has bad collateral
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from Assumption 2. The constraint (13) is rewritten as
(1  f)

I   pRiI I

 g. (14)
While the right-hand side of (14) is the cost of acquiring information, the left-hand side
of (14) is the benefit of acquiring information; the investor who meets the firm with bad
collateral with probability 1  f can avoid a loss of I   pRiI I by not lending.
Firms have incentives to reduce a repayment RiI I to increase their payoff. When g
is high, we can ignore the constraint (14) so that the optimal contract problem becomes
equivalent to the benchmark problem (1)-(5) with f˜ = f; that is, (9) binds and firms
receive the whole social surplus pR   I. However, when g is low, RiI I is determined
at which (14) binds because a lower RiI I strengthens the investors’ incentives to acquire
information. This means that for investors with lower g, firms must lower the benefit of
information production by increasing repayment RiI I and reducing the expected loss that
informed investors are able to avoid.
The mechanism through which the lower-g investors require higher compensation
RiI I does not necessarily imply that they earn positive net payoff. If firms can decrease
the probability of losing collateral xI I until (9) binds, investors still break even. However,
because a higher RiI I reduces firms’ stake R  RiI I and weakens their commitment to be-
have, they must choose xI I to satisfy the IC constraint (11) rather than the IR constraint
(9) if g is sufficiently low. In this case, (9) is not binding and the firm leaves rent for the
investor.8
Lemma 1 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. If I   r  fC and g  gI I  (1  
f) [I   r  pmin fpR  r, fCg], firms can borrow funds by offering information-insensitive
8See Dang (2008), who also shows that in asset markets, a party responding to a take-it-or-leave-it-offer
can extract some surplus of the transaction when the offer is designed to deter information acquisition.
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debt contracts, which yield the firms’ net payoff,
U fI I =
8>><>>:
pR  I if gI I  g,
pR  I   (1  p)(1  f)(I   r)  g
p(1  f) if gI I  g < gI I ,
(15)




, and the investors’ net payoff,
UiI I =
8>><>>:
0 if gI I  g,
(1  p)(1  f)(I   r)  g
p(1  f) if gI I  g < gI I .
(16)
Otherwise, firms cannot offer information-insensitive contracts.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 1 implies that if the level of expertise is in the intermediate range (gI I  g <
gI I), the investors earn a net positive payoff (UiI I > 0), and as the level of expertise is
higher, they are able to extract larger rents from firms (U fI I is increasing in g and U
i
I I is
decreasing in g). In information-insensitive contracts, financial expertise allows investors
to improve their bargaining position with firms that have all the bargaining power by
creating fear of information acquisition. However, if the level of expertise is sufficiently
high (g < gI I), firms must either lose on the financial contract, resulting in the violation
of (10), or cannot pose more collateral, resulting in the violation of (12). Either way, firms
do not obtain financing by issuing information-insensitive debt.
Then, we consider that firms optimally design the information-sensitive debt contract
(RiIS, xIS). An informed investor funds only a firm with good collateral. This implies that
once investors accept the offered contract, the firms correctly infer that their collateral













pRiIS + (1  p)xISC  I
i
  g  0, (18)
f
h
p(R  RiIS)  (1  p)xISC
i
 0, (19)










The firm maximizes the net expected payoff (17) subject to the IR constraint for the in-
vestor (18), the IR constraint for the firm (19), the IC constraint (20), the feasibility con-
straint (21), and the constraint that triggers information acquisition (22).
Characterization of the optimal contract inducing information acquisition is straight-
forward. A lower RiIS increases the firms’ profit (17) and relaxes the constraints (20) and
(22). Thus, the firms decrease RiIS until (18) binds and obtain the entire social surplus
f(pR  I)  g, where they have to incur the cost of information acquisition g. This im-
plies that any financial contract (RiIS, xIS) that satisfies (18) with equality and the remain-
ing constraints is optimal. A higher xIS and a lower RiIS relaxes the constraints (20) and
(22), making financing more likely. The following lemma characterizes the financing con-
dition in the case of information-sensitive contracts.
Lemma 2 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. If
g  gIS  fmin f(1  p)(1  f)C, r+ C  I, pR  Ig ,
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firms can borrow funds by offering information-sensitive debt contracts, which yields the firms’
net payoff,
U fIS = f(pR  I)  g, (23)
and the investors’ net payoff, UiIS = 0. Otherwise, firms cannot offer information-sensitive con-
tracts.
Lemma 2 implies that if the level of expertise is sufficiently high (g  gIS), firms can
offer information-sensitive contracts, and a higher level of expertise increases their pay-
offs (U fIS is decreasing in g). In contrast with information-insensitive contracts, financial
expertise increases the total surplus from the financial contract and investors must earn
zero payoff. If the level of expertise is sufficiently low (g > gIS), at least one of the
constraints (19), (20), and (22) is violated, meaning that firms cannot obtain financing by
offering information-sensitive contracts.
Based on Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, a firm chooses between information-insensitive and
information-sensitive contracts to maximize its payoff. As shown in Figure 3, the firm’s
payoff depends on g. U fI I is nondecreasing in g from (15), whereas U
f
IS is decreasing in g
from (23). Thus, the firm chooses to offer information-insensitive contracts if U fI I  U fIS,
that is, g  gc given by
gc  1  f




  (1  pf)(pR  I)

, (24)
and if information-insensitive contracts are feasible, that is, g  gI I . This implies that if
g is sufficiently high that g  maxfgI I ,gcg, firms offer information-insensitive contracts.
Whether firms with good collateral secure financing when g < maxfgI I ,gcg depends
on parameters. If g  gIS, firms can offer information-sensitive contracts and those
with good collateral obtain financing. However, if g > gIS, no firm secures financing.
While Figure 3a illustrates the situation in which for all g, either information-insensitive






















(b) When gI I > gc
Figure 3: The comparison of payoffs between information-insensitive contracts and information-
sensitive contracts when gI I = (1  f)

I   (1  p)r  p2R and gIS = f(pR  I)
some g, financial markets collapse.
The following proposition summarizes the result of equilibrium contract.
Proposition 2 (Optimal financial contract) Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and that
I   r  fC.
(i) If g  maxfgI I ,gcg, firms choose information-insensitive contracts.
(ii) If g < maxfgI I ,gcg and g  gIS, firms choose information-sensitive contracts.
(iii) Otherwise, they cannot secure financing.
4.2 Acquisition of Financial Expertise
Anticipating that firms offer a financial contract depending on g, each investor chooses
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Figure 4: Investors’ payoff
contracting are given by:
Ui(g) =
8>><>>:
(1  p)(1  f)(I   r)  g




 g < gI I ,
0 otherwise,
(25)
as depicted in Figure 4. If maxfgI I ,gcg  g < gI I , investors with lower g earn higher
payoffs by using their expertise as a threat to firms that offer information-insensitive con-
tracts; otherwise, the investors must break even.
The equilibrium level of expertise is given by
g  argmax
g2[0,gmax]
Ui(g)  y(gmax   g). (26)
To guarantee that investors acquire expertise in equilibrium, i.e., g < gmax, and g is
unique, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 3 gmax and the function y(gmax   g) are such that
1. gI I < gmax  gI I ,
2. y(0) = 0,y0 > 0,y00 > 0, and limg!gmax y0(gmax   g) < 1p(1 f) .
The cost function y(gmax   g) that satisfies this assumption is illustrated in Figure 4.
20








if 1p(1 f) < y
0

gmax  maxf0,gI I ,gcg





gmax  maxf0,gI I ,gcg

is sufficiently high, the equilibrium level of expertise
is determined at the point at which its marginal benefit equals its marginal cost. When
y0

gmax  maxf0,gI I ,gcg

is sufficiently low, investors acquire expertise to the point
where additional acquisition of expertise either stops firms from offering information-
insensitive contracts or is impossible: g = maxf0,gI I ,gcg. In both cases, there is exper-
tise acquisition but never information acquisition in equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (Emergence of ignorant experts) Suppose that Assumptions 1–3 hold and that
I  r  fC. Then, in equilibrium, the level of financial expertise g is given by (27), and all firms
obtain financing without inducing information acquisition.
4.3 Low Pledgeability
To highlight the effect of pledgeability r on expertise acquisition, this section considers
the case of low pledgeability r < I   fC, where information-insensitive contracts are not
feasible from Lemma 1. At the stage of optimal contracting, a firm offers information-
sensitive contracts for an investor with g  gIS and cannot obtain financing from an
investor with g > gIS from Lemma 2. Under this situation, investors with any g have
zero payoff, Ui(g) = 0. As a result, (26) implies that expertise acquisition does not take
place.
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium in the case of low pledgeabil-
ity.
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Proposition 4 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and that I   r > fC. Then, the equilib-
rium level of expertise is given by g = gmax. If gmax  gIS, information acquisition arises and
only firms with good collateral obtain financing. If gmax > gIS, no firm secures financing.
The result of no expertise acquisition is due to a hold-up problem. By investing in
expertise and reducing the cost of information acquisition, investors allow firms offering
information-sensitive contracts to earn higher payoffs. Once the investment has been
sunk, however, firms with full bargaining power offer contracts that yield zero payoff for
investors. Because the investors anticipate that they are unable to recoup the cost of their
investment in expertise, there is no incentive to make such an investment.
By comparing Proposition 3 and Proposition 4, we confirm that high pledgeability
is associated with large compensation for investors, a high level of their expertise, no
screening, and large aggregate output. This suggests that economies with well-developed
financial markets have a larger size of the financial sector and achieve a higher level of
economic development than those with underdeveloped financial markets.
4.4 Efficiency
We now turn to efficiency. Consider that a social planner chooses the financial contract
and level of expertise to maximize firms’ payoff subject to the same information frictions
as the equilibrium analysis. The planner cannot observe quality of assets, firms’ choices
between behaving and misbehaving, or investors’ information acquisition. The key dif-
ference from the equilibrium analysis is that the planner has the ability to commit to
financial contracts.
When pledgeability is high enough that I   r  fC, it is socially desirable to prevent
investors from acquiring information from Proposition 1. Thus, the planner’s problem is
to choose (RiI I , xI I ,g) that maximizes (8), subject to the IR constraint for firms (10), the IC
constraint (11), the feasibility constraint (12), the information-non-acquisition constraint
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(14), and investors’ IR constraint,
pRiI I + (1  p)xI IfC  I   y(gmax   g)  0. (28)
(28) is different from (9) because the investment in expertise is not sunk. In this optimiza-
tion problem, an increase in g relaxes (14) and (28), thereby increasing the firm’s payoff.
The socially optimal level of g is given by gS = gmax. Then, since (28) becomes the same
as (9), the financial contract (RiI I , xI I) that the planner designs is the same as the solu-
tion of the optimization problem (8)-(13) with g = gmax. As a result, the planner facing
information frictions achieves the first-best allocation.
By contrast, when pledgeability is low such that I   r > fC, information enhances
liquidity from Proposition 1 so that the planner’s problem is to choose (RiIS, xIS,g) that
maximizes (17), subject to the IR constraint for the firm (19), the IC constraint (20), the fea-




pRiIS + (1  p)xISC  I
i
  g  y(gmax   g)  0. (29)
Since (29) is binding, the firm’s payoff becomes f(pR  I) g y(gmax g). The planner
chooses g to maximize this payoff without taking into account the remaining constraints
because a lower g merely relaxes (20) and (22). Thus, the socially optimal level of g
is given by gS = maxfgmax   y0 1 (1) , 0g. The planner is indifferent to any contract
(RiIS, xIS) that satisfies (29) with equality and the remaining constraints.
Proposition 5 (Inefficiency of expertise acquisition) Suppose that Assumptions 1–3 hold.
If I   r  fC, the socially optimal level of expertise satisfies gS = gmax > g. If I   r > fC, it
satisfies gS = maxfgmax   y0 1 (1) , 0g < g.
Proposition 5 emphasizes the importance of commitment. When pledgeability is high
enough, information production generates illiquidity and investment in expertise ismerely
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a waste of resources. The planner with the ability to commit to financial contracts refrains
from acquisition of expertise. Without the commitment, however, investors can use exper-
tise as a threat to improve their bargaining position with firms. This motivates investors
to acquire expertise. Thus, over-investment in expertise arises in equilibrium.
In contrast, when pledgeability is sufficiently low, information production increases
the total surplus from the financial contracts and investments in expertise are value-
enhancing activities. Although in equilibrium, investors do not acquire expertise because
of a hold-up problem, the planner with the commitment ability overcomes this problem.
Thus, under-investment in expertise arises in equilibrium.
Proposition 5 suggests that policy implications differ depending on the pledgeabil-
ity. On the one hand, in an economy with well-developed financial markets, investors
acquire expertise excessively, so that there is a need for the government to discourage
the acquisition of expertise. One measure is to introduce a cap on investors’ compensa-
tion Ri. Since firms find it more difficult to deter investors’ information acquisition, the
bonus limits can reduce rents that the investors extract and discourage their incentives
to acquire expertise. On the other hand, in an economy with underdeveloped financial
markets, the government can improve social welfare by encouraging investors to acquire
expertise and screen collateral with a low cost. This may justify subsidies for the financial
firms that play a role in examining the quality of collateral.
4.5 Discussion about Assumptions
Here, several assumptions are worth emphasizing.
Financial contracts: We could consider a more general contract (T,Ri, x) that allows
for flexible up-front payments from the investor to the firm T  I. However, the firm
could not gain through this additional dimension. If the information-non-acquisition con-
straint binds and investors earn a positive payoff, a higher T increases the loss of lending
to a firm with bad collateral and requires a higher repayment to deter information acqui-
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sition, which makes the IC constraint more difficult to satisfy. Otherwise, since firms that
secure financing receives the entire social surplus, a higher T does not affect their payoff,
while making it more difficult for them to raise funds. Thus, T = I is the optimal choice
for the firms.
Search frictions: We thus far assume that once a firm meets an investor and fails to
borrow funds, the firm cannot find another investor. This eliminates the competition
between investors and allows them to extract rents from firms. If firms are on the short
side of the market and can search for an investor without costs, the firms would try to
borrow funds from investors with a level of expertise that maximizes the firms’ payoff.
Because a lower level of expertise decreases investors’ compensation and increases firms’
payoffs, investors have an incentive to slightly decrease their levels of expertise compared
with other investors. The competition among investors discourages expertise acquisition.
5 Dynamics
This section extends the static model of Section 2 into a dynamic setting. Section 5.1
describes the setup of the dynamic model. Following Gorton and Ordoñez (2014), the
distribution of beliefs about collateral value is the unique state variable, creating dynamic
linkage. Section 5.2 shows how investors’ compensation and level of expertise grow and
credit expands as information about collateral decays over time,. Section 5.3 introduces a
negative aggregate shock on asset quality that can lead to a crisis.
5.1 Setting
Time is discrete and continues forever: t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . The model is populated by over-
lapping generations of a continuum of agents with unit mass who live for two periods
as young and old. They are risk-neutral with no discounting between periods and their
preferences over consumption streams are represented by cy + co. When young, agents
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become investors and are endowed with a sufficient amount of goods. When old, they
become firms and are endowed with a project but no goods. We assume that goods are
perishable and there is no storage technology. This means that firms need external financ-
ing.
One unit of asset, which has two types of quality, is distributed only to each agent of
the initial generation; a fraction f of the initial agents receive a good asset, and a fraction
1  f of the initial agents receive a bad asset. The intrinsic value of a good (bad) asset
is C (0), and when the owner of the asset extracts its intrinsic value, it disappears. This
means that an asset is storable and can be transferred to the next generation and used as
collateral unless its owner consumes its intrinsic value. We also assume that an asset is
indivisible.
Every period, the quality of the asset may change because of idiosyncratic shocks. For
each asset, the idiosyncratic shock does not hit with probability l 2 (0, 1) and hits with
probability 1  l regardless of the quality of the asset. While the quality of the asset that
does not receive the shock remains unchanged, the quality of the asset that receives the
shock becomes goodwith probability f and badwith probability 1 f. While the shock is
observable, whether the asset becomes good or bad after the shock is unobservable. The
structure of idiosyncratic shocks is depicted in Figure 5. Under this specific structure,
when the true quality of collateral is identified and the beliefs on the probability of good
collateral are given by f˜ = 0 or f˜ = 1, the shock makes the quality unknown and changes
the associated belief to f˜ = f. When an asset that is of unknown quality and has the
belief f˜ = f receives the shock, the belief does not change.
Figure 6 shows the sequence of events within a period. Each investor (young individ-
ual) acquires expertise and, then, idiosyncratic shocks occur. Each firm (old individual)
is matched with an investor and offers financial contracts (Ri, x). The investor decides
whether to acquire information and whether to accept the offer. If the investor accepts
















Figure 5: Idiosyncratic shock
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realized. At the end of the period, the owner of each asset decides whether to consume its
intrinsic value, to hold the asset, or to sell it to the owner’s counterpart. For simplicity, we
assume that when assets are traded, a buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a seller.
We assume that when the investor acquires private information, the information be-
comes public. This assumption simplifies the analysis by allowing all agents to share
beliefs on collateral and restores information symmetry at the end of the period.
5.2 Credit Boom and Escalating Levels of Expertise
We begin by analyzing asset markets. Because investors use an asset as collateral in the
next period, they evaluate the value of asset more highly than firms. This implies that
a firm that holds an asset becomes a seller, whereas an investor who does not hold the
asset becomes a buyer. Under the situation where both the investor and the firm have
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common beliefs on collateral, f˜, the investor offers the transfer price f˜C that makes the
firm indifferent between selling the asset and consuming the intrinsic value.
This price setting allows us to apply the result of the static model directly to the dy-
namic model in which the beliefs f˜ take three values (0, f, and 1) and the distribution of
beliefs f˜ is the unique state variable. When firms have collateral with f˜ = 0 or f˜ = 1, they
offer the optimal contract while ignoring investors’ information acquisition, as analyzed
in Section 3. While firms with collateral f˜ = 1 offer a financial contract that solves the
optimization problem (1)-(5), firms with collateral f˜ = 0 cannot secure financing. When
firms have collateral with f˜ = f, they choose between contracts that induce information
acquisition or not, as analyzed in Section 4. We from now on assume that pledgeable cash
flows r are sufficiently high that information about collateral reduces liquidity:
Assumption 4 0 < I   r  fC.
This is a stronger assumption than Assumption 2 and ensures that on the equilibrium
path, firms with collateral f˜ = f offer information-insensitive contracts from Proposi-
tion 3.
We assume that at the initial period (t = 0), all agents are fully informed about the true
value of assets. This means that at t = 0, there is no opaque collateral (i.e., collateral with
belief f˜ = f) and only firms that have collateral with belief f˜ = 1 obtain funds. Figure 7
illustrates the transitional dynamics with a numerical example. In every period, some
firms receive a shock and have collateral with belief f˜ = f, which allows them to secure
financing by offering information-insensitive contracts. Correspondingly, the fraction of
opaque collateral increases over time (upper-left panel); after t period, the distribution of
beliefs concerning the probability of good collateral, f (f˜), is given by f (0) = lt(1  f),
f (f) = 1  lt, and f (1) = ltf. Because firms with bad collateral are able to invest in
projects after receiving the shock, net aggregate output, given by (1  lt + ltf)(pR  I),
rises over time (upper-right panel).
The opportunity of information-insensitive lending allows investors to increase their
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Notes: The horizontal axis represents periods from t = 0 to t = 100. We assume
y(gmax   g) = 12d (gmax   g)2 and gmax = gI I . The parameters used are p = 0.7,R = 2.5,
Dp = 0.3, I = 1.5, B = 0.45,C = 1.3, f = 0.8, l = 0.93, and d = 0.01.
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(1  lt)Ui(g)  y(gmax   g). (30)
In contrast with (26), investors meet firms with collateral f˜ = f with probability f (f).
This implies that as a fraction of opaque collateral increases, investors have a greater
opportunity to extract rents by information-insensitive lending and are more willing to
acquire expertise. Thus, as time goes by, the cost of information acquisition, gt , de-
creases (lower-left panel) and investors’ expected profits, (1  lt)Ui (gt )  y(gmax   gt ),
increase (lower-right panel).
Proposition 6 Suppose that Assumptions 1, 3, and 4 hold and that at the initial period, there is
full information about asset quality. A fraction of opaque collateral, net aggregate output, levels of
expertise, and expected profits for investors grow over time.
Proposition 6 highlights the linkage between prevalence of opaque assets, a credit
boom, and growth in the financial sector. This captures the important aspects during the
run-up to the financial crisis. Before the crisis, dramatic growth in securitization produced
opaque financial securities and fueled a credit boom. Concurrently with this financial
innovation, the financial industry grew; the financial sector share of GDP has increased
from about 5 percent in 1980 to about 8 percent in 2006 (Greenwood and Scharfstein, 2013,
Philippon, 2015). Our model suggests that an increase in the use of securitized products
in financial transactions leads the financial sector to invest more in expertise and extract
larger rents from the corporate sector of the economy.
5.3 Financial Fragility
Next, we introduce negative aggregate shocks on asset quality. We assume that the ag-
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Figure 8: Effect of an aggregate shock on financial contracts when gI I  gc
Agents can observe whether the aggregate shock hits but cannot observe who receives
the shock. Thus, the aggregate shock changes beliefs f˜ = f into f˜ = hf and beliefs
f˜ = 1 into f˜ = h, while f˜ = 0 remains unchanged. Suppose that the aggregate shock
hits unexpectedly after the acquisition of expertise by investors but before financial con-
tracts.9 This implies that when the aggregate shock hits, investors cannot adjust levels of
expertise, but firms that have collateral with belief f˜ = hf or f˜ = h can design financial
contracts given such beliefs.
Figure 8 illustrates the impact of aggregate shocks on the payoff of firms with col-
lateral f˜ = f and the financial contracts when gI I  gc. After the belief is reduced
to f˜ = hf, the expected payoff of the firm that offers information-sensitive contracts
decreases because the probability of financing decreases. The expected payoff of firms
that offer information-insensitive contracts also decreases because the increased proba-
bility that an investor meets a firm with bad collateral strengthens information acquisi-
tion incentives and leads to greater rents for the investor. If the aggregate shock 1  h is
sufficiently small, the latter effect dominates the former, implying that the information-
sensitive region widens and the information-insensitive region narrows.
9We consider only the unexpected aggregate shock for simplicity. Even if agents anticipate that the
aggregate shock hits, as long as the probability that the shock hits is sufficiently small, investors do not
refrain from acquiring expertise and our result remains unchanged.
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Figure 9: The boom and bust
Notes: The horizontal axis represents periods from t = 0 to t = 100. We assume that h = 0.94 and
aggregate shocks hit in periods t = 5 and t = 50.
In this case, whether the aggregate shock induces informational regime change de-
pends on the level of expertise. When investors have a low level of expertise (for ex-
ample, g0 in Figure 8), the firms with collateral f˜ = hf choose information-insensitive
contracts. However, when investors acquire a high level of expertise (for example, g00),
the shock induces the firms with collateral f˜ = hf to choose information-sensitive rather
than information-insensitive contracts.10
Figure 9 shows how the economy fluctuates in response to aggregate shocks. To sim-
plify the explanation, we assume that the aggregate shock 1  h is sufficiently small that
firmswith collateral f˜ = h offer information-insensitive contracts in the equilibrium path.
After the first shock is realized (in period 5), the fraction of good assets decreases from
f to hf, and then moves back to the original level, f, because of idiosyncratic mean re-
verting shocks, as displayed in the left panel. Despite the negative aggregate shock, the
credit boom continues (the right panel). As shown in the lower-left panel of Figure 7,
when the fraction of the opaque collateral is small, investors have not acquired enough
10When gI I  gc and the aggregate shock 1  h is sufficiently large, both the information-sensitive and
information-insensitive regions could narrow and the region of no financing could widen. When gI I > gc,
the aggregate shock necessarily narrows the information-sensitive and information-insensitive regions and
widens the region of no financing. Under these situations, the aggregate shock can prevent firms with
collateral f˜ = hf from obtaining funds. However, since this possibility does not change our qualitative
result, we focus on the situation in which the firms can issue either information-insensitive or information-
sensitive debt even after the aggregate shock hits.
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expertise, and thus firms with opaque collateral can continue to choose information-
insensitive contracts. However, when the increase in opaque collateral and the corre-
sponding credit boom last long enough, investors acquire a high level of expertise. In this
case, as shown in Figure 8, the aggregate shock induces the firms with opaque collateral
to select information-sensitive contracts. As a result, if their collateral is identified as bad,
they cannot obtain financing, and net aggregate output must decrease. Indeed, when an
aggregate shock hits in period 50, it causes a sharp drop in aggregate output. Then, the
economy begins to recover and net aggregate output grows again.
Proposition 7 Suppose that Assumptions 1, 3, and 4 hold and that at the initial period, there is
full information about asset quality. Assume that hf  fc, where








p(pR  I) < 1. (31)
There exists time tc such that if t < tc, a negative aggregate shock on collateral does not affect
aggregate output, and if t  tc, the shock generates a crisis.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 7 has a different implication from that in Gorton and Ordoñez (2014). In
their setup, where the level of expertise is exogenously given, the possibility that an ag-
gregate shock causes a decline in output is independent of a fraction of opaque collat-
eral. In contrast, our model predicts that the possibility that the shock generates a drop
in output rises as a fraction of opaque collateral increases because this encourages the
acquisition of expertise and leaves the financial market more vulnerable to a shock. This
difference implies that a credit boomwith growth in expertise tends to cause a large crash
compared to one without growth in expertise.
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6 Conclusion
This study analyzes inefficiencies in expertise acquisition in a model of debt funding mar-
kets, in which the expertise enables the production of information about the underlying
collateral at a low cost. We show that the reason for inefficient expertise acquisition differs
depending on the degree of pledgeability. If the pledgeability is low, investors’ informa-
tion acquisition can enhance liquidity, but they refrain from the acquisition of expertise
because of a hold-up problem. However, if the pledgeability is high, information acqui-
sition generates illiquidity, which allows investors to improve their bargaining position
with firms by acquiring expertise. In equilibrium, investors acquire expertise but provide
funds to firms without producing information. The emergence of such ignorant experts
leads to a credit boom, due to their ignorance, and a subsequent crisis, due to their exper-
tise. Our theory proposes a novel explanation that links prevalence of opaque assets with
growth in the financial sector and the financial crisis.
One important issue we did not discuss is the effect of public information. We as-
sumed that there is no asymmetric information between firms and investors unless they
produce private information. However, investors may have superior information on the
quality of underlying collateral even without producing information because they have
higher ability to process public information and understand the value of securities. Ex
ante informational asymmetry would enhance investors’ ability to extract rents because
firms fear that investors may receive bad signals about collateral from public informa-
tion and be more willing to acquire private information. The interaction between public
information and private information acquisition and its impact on financial firms’ com-
pensation and expertise acquisition would be an important issue for future research.
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Appendix A Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. A lower RiI I increases the firm’s profit and makes (11) more likely to hold. The
firm decreases RiI I until (9) or (14) hold as equality.
First, suppose that (9) is binding. In this case, firms that secure financing obtain the
payoffU fI I = pR  I, so that (10) is not binding. Thus, they are indifferent to RiI I and xI I if
they obtain financing. Since a lower RiI I and a higher xI I relaxes (11), the financial contract
that gives the firms the entire social surplus can be offered as long as (i) (12) holds with
equality (xI I = 1) and (11) and (14) are satisfied, that is, I   r  fC  g(1 p)(1 f) or (ii)
(14) holds with equality and (11) and (12) are satisfied, that is, I   r  g
(1 p)(1 f)  fC.
Thus, if
I   r  g
(1  p)(1  f) , (32)
(9) is binding and firms’ payoff is given by U fI I = pR  I.
Next, suppose that (32) does not hold, that is, gI I > g. This implies that (14) binds
but (9) holds with strict inequality. Since RiI I is determined by (14) holding with equality,
the firm’s profit (8) becomes U fI I = pR   I   (1  p)xI IfC + g/(1  f). Because U fI I is









In this case, the firm secures financing as long as (10) and (12) are satisfied, that is, gI I  g.
Note that









from Assumption 1 and the condition I   r  fC. Finally, if g is so small that gI I > g,
financing does not occur.
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Appendix B Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Proposition 2 suggests that the information-insensitive region is g  maxfgI I ,gcg.
gI I = (1  f) [I   r  pmin fpR  r, fCg] is decreasing in f, while gc is decreasing in f




(pR  I)([p(1  f) + 1]2   p)  p(1  p)B/Dp
[p(1  f) + 1]2 ,
where the numerator is decreasing in f and negative when f = 1 from Assumption 4.
After an aggregate shock that reduces the belief f˜ = f to f˜ = hf, gI I increases to
gˆI I  (1  hf) [I   r  pmin fpR  r, hfCg] , (33)
and, if hf  fc, gc also increases to
gˆc  1  hf




  (1  phf)(pR  I)

. (34)
Thus, maxfgI I ,gcg < maxfgˆI I , gˆcg, implying that the aggregate shockmakes the information-
insensitive region narrower.
Suppose that the first aggregate shock hits in period t. If gt  maxfgˆI I , gˆcg, firms
that have collateral with belief f˜ = hf issue information-insensitive debt, and the shock
does not affect aggregate output given by (1  lt + ltf)(pR  I). If gt < maxfgˆI I , gˆcg,
firms with collateral f˜ = hf issue information-sensitive debt or cannot receive financing.
In either case, aggregate output declines.








if 1 ltp(1 f) < y
0

gmax  maxf0,gI I ,gcg

maxf0,gI I ,gcg otherwise,
(35)
36
where gt is nonincreasing in time t. Thus, if limt!¥ gt < maxfgˆI I , gˆcg, there exists a
threshold tc 2 [0,¥) such that for t < tc, an aggregate shock does not affect output, and
for t  tc, the shock causes a drop in output; otherwise, for any t, the aggregate shock
does not affect output.
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